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COMMUNICATION AND SHARED REALITY:
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
FOUNDATIONS OF CULTURE
Ivy Y-M. Lau, Chi-yue Chiu, and Sau-lai Lee
University of Hong Kong
In view of the recent development of macro-level theories concerning the spatial
and temporal distribution of social representations, this paper presents a conceptu-
alization of the evolution of shared beliefs from individual interactions, focusing on
the role of communication. Drawing on the existing research literature and our
own research findings on communication and cognition, we argue that the recipro-
cal relationship between shared reality and communication enables the develop-
ment of systems of social representations at an individual level. Specifically, when
formulating and comprehending messages, communicative partners draw on what
they estimate to be shared knowledge among them. In addition, while communi-
cating, communicative partners also strive to form shared representations of the
topic of communication, which may overshadow pre-existing nonlinguistic repre-
sentations. Moreover, contextual factors that influence communication also affect
the development of shared reality. Based on these findings, we discuss how the
communicative process drives the differential propagation of certain social repre-
sentations, and how the psychological consequences brought about by the inter-
play of the context and process of communication form the psychological basis for
the development and changes of social representations.
Recent cross-cultural research has revealed deep cultural variations in
basic psychological processes such as attention (Chavajay & Rogoff,
1999), categorization (Atran & Medin, 1997), thinking style (Nisbett,
Peng, Choi, & Norenzayan, 2001; Peng & Nisbett, 1999), attribution
(Menon, Morris, Chiu, & Hong, 1999; Morris & Peng, 1994),
self-construal (Heine, Lehman, Markus, & Kitayama, 1999), self-regula-
tory focus (Lee, Aaker, & Gardner, 2000), prediction of future life events
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(Oishi, Wyer, & Colcombe, 2000), and motivational orientation (Iyengar
& Lepper, 1999). These cultural differences are often explained in terms
of cultural variations in shared lay beliefs about the self (Markus &
Kitayama, 1991), personal attributes (Chiu, Hong, & Dweck, 1997; Chiu,
Dweck, Tong, & Fu, 1997), human agency (Hernandez & Iyengar, this is-
sue; Hong, Ip, & Chiu, this issue; Menon et al., 1999; Morris & Fu, this is-
sue), and the natural world (Atran, 1998). One core assumption behind
this kind of explanation is that shared beliefs in a culture unify the cogni-
tive and motivational processes in the culture and create different sys-
tems of meaning attributions across cultures. In this connection,
research has revealed the dynamic processes underlying the activation
of such shared beliefs, as well as the cognitive consequences of cultural
belief activation (Chiu, Morris, Hong, & Menon, 2000; Hong, Morris,
Chiu, & Benet-Martinez, 2000).
Surprisingly, with a few exceptions (Chiu, Krauss, & Lee, 1999; Hardin
& Higgins, 1996; Kashima, 2000b; Latane & L’ Herrou, 1996), relatively
little attention has been given to how shared beliefs in a culture evolve in
human interactions. In this paper, drawing on the existing research liter-
ature and our own research findings on communication and cognition,
we describe the reciprocal relationship between shared reality and com-
munication, which, as we argue in the next section, has important impli-
cations for understanding the psychological foundations of culture.
First, we describe the role of shared reality in successful communica-
tion. For successful communication to take place, the speaker and the lis-
tener have to attribute similar meanings to the topic of conversation. We
then explain how communicators establish a shared representation of
the topic of conversation in the communication process. Next, we review
our recent research on the cognitive consequences of referential commu-
nication. Evidence from this research suggests that communication
could lead to internalization of shared representations. Finally, we dis-
cuss how explicating the interface between communication and shared
reality can enhance our understanding of culture as a dynamic system of
shared meanings.
In short, unlike most analyses of culture and cognition which focus on
differences and similarities in some basic social cognitive processes, the
objective of the present paper is to delineate the implications of the inter-
face between communication and shared reality in order to reach a more
thorough understanding of the psychological foundations of culture.
COMMUNICATION AND SHARED REPRESENTATIONS
According to Webster’s Ninth New Collegiate Dictionary (1987), culture is
“the integrated pattern of human knowledge, belief, and behavior that
depends upon man’s capacity for learning and transmitting knowledge
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to succeeding generations; [it is] the customary beliefs, social norms, and
material traits of a racial, religious, or social group” (p. 314). This defini-
tion highlights the intertwining of culture and human cognition. Central
to culture are socially shared knowledge and beliefs; in other words, so-
cial representations. Some cognitive anthropologists believe that to be
culturally influential, a social representation has to be “widely and dura-
bly distributed in a social group” (Sperber, 1996, p. 49). Why are some
representations widely and durably distributed and some are not? One
possible explanation suggested by Sperber (1996) has to do with inter-
personal communication. According to him, “those representations
which are repeatedly communicated and minimally transformed in the
process will end up belonging to the culture” (p. 83, italics in original).
He contends that to explain cultural beliefs, one has to understand how
these beliefs “are cognized by individuals and how they are communi-
cated within a group” (p. 97). Thus, a crucial part of understanding the
psychological foundation of culture is to fully appreciate the contribu-
tion of communication in macro-level phenomena, such as the distribu-
tion and evolution of social representations, and in micro-level
phenomena, such as the building of shared reality between individuals.
DISTRIBUTION OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
Dynamic social impact theory (Latané, 1996) postulates that the complex
system of social representations we refer to as culture develops through a
sequence of self-organization: clustering, correlation, consolidation, and
continuing diversity. The sequence comes about because we influence
and are influenced by proximal people we communicate with in our so-
cial world (e.g., people in the same office or neighborhood). These people
vary in their individual ability to influence others. As we discuss and in-
teract with our neighbors and others in close physical distance, those who
are more convincing can usually persuade more people to agree with
them. Thus, sets of beliefs, values, and practices become spatially differen-
tiated (or clustered). Consequently, different beliefs, values, or practices
become strongly associated (or correlated), even without any necessary
logical or semantic connections among them. As the process of social in-
fluence continues, there is a tendency for beliefs, values, and practices to
reduce in diversity (or consolidate). Although consolidation could ulti-
mately result in complete amalgamation, clustering protects minorities
from majority influence, thus ensuring continuing diversity.
The group phenomena predicted by dynamic social impact theory
have been borne out in both in-vivo and computer simulation studies. In
a series of computer-mediated human communication games using the
electronic mailing system, Latané and his colleagues (Huguet, Latané, &
Bourgeois, 1995; Latané & Bourgeois, 1996; Latané & L’Herrou, 1996) ob-
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served the development of majority and minority representations.
Typically, participants in these studies were organized into groups of 24.
Each person was informed of the majority opinions and allowed to com-
municate with only a fixed number of individuals, thus forming com-
munication groups (approximating physical constraints in real life).
Over a number of electronic sessions, opinions began to become more
alike among communicating participants (clustering). In addition, pre-
viously uncorrelated issues were correlated within communication
groups toward the end of the study. Furthermore, as participants were
exposed to others (the majority’s) opinions over the course of the study,
the diversity of opinions were reduced. However, at the end of the stud-
ies, even with incentives to agree with the opinions of the majority, there
still remained pockets of different opinions, probably because the mi-
nority group had overestimated the popularity of their opinion as a re-
sult of clustering (Latané, 1996).
In a different context, the results of a 3-year longitudinal study of polit-
ical socialization of commerce and social sciences students by Guimond
and Palmer (1996) illustrated the origin of subcultures. It was reported
that, over time, commerce students became less likely than social sci-
ences students to attribute poverty and unemployment to systemic fac-
tors (clustering). Furthermore, beliefs about different causes of poverty
that were unrelated in the first year became related in the third year (cor-
relation). Toward the end of their studies, students developed social rep-
resentations that were more structured and typical of their counterparts
in their respective academic areas.
EVOLUTION OF REPRESENTATIONS
Culture as a complex system of meanings is continuously being pro-
duced and maintained through the dynamic production and reproduc-
tion of meanings in everyday social interactions (Lyon & Kashima, this
issue; Kashima, 2000a). Kashima and his colleagues (Kashima, 1999,
2000a, 2000b; Kashima & Kerekesh, 1994; Kashima, Woolcock, & King,
1998; Lyons & Kashima, this issue) have examined the formation, main-
tenance, and change of social representations over time. Their findings
have lent insights into the evolution of representations.
In several studies of serial reproduction of stories which contained
both stereotype consistent and inconsistent information (Kashima,
2000a; Lyons & Kashima, this issue), information that was inconsistent
with cultural stereotypes was retained proportionately more than con-
sistent information at the beginning of the chain. As the chain of repro-
ductions continued, inconsistent information began to drop off
drastically, leaving the consistent information to dominate the last re-
productions. Thus, the stereotypes were maintained through the chain
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of reproductions. One explanation for the collective reproduction of ste-
reotypic information focuses on interpersonal communication. Un-
avoidably some information is lost in the process of reproduction. In
order to present a coherent narrative to the next person, the communica-
tors may prefer to include information that they believe the audience
will understand and accept. Stereotypic information, which presumably
is widely shared in the culture, has advantages over stereotype inconsis-
tent information, and hence more likely to be kept in the narrative. The
results point to the significant contribution of interpersonal communica-
tion to the maintenance of cultural stereotypes.
Although cultural stereotypes tend to be collectively maintained while
being reproduced, they are also subjected to change when important new
information and facts surface. Kashima and his colleagues (Kashima,
1999, 2000a, 2000b; Kashima & Kerekesh, 1994; Kashima et al., 1998) pro-
pose the Tensor Product Model (TPM) to approximate the change process
in social representations over time. The team of researchers postulates
that representations of a social group are based on episodic interactions
with and/or communication concerning the group. Once constructed, a
representation is stored in memory. When a new episode occurs or new
information is communicated, a new representation will be constructed
and superimposed on the pre-existing representation. To the extent that
differences in the relevant dimensions occur, the representation in ques-
tion is changed. As a series of related episodes or communications occurs
over time, the representation slowly evolves. The TPM can satisfactorily
explain the primacy and recency effects on group impression formation,
and how stereotype changes after inconsistent information is encoun-
tered (Kashima, Woolcock, & Kashima, 2000).
Research on the dynamic social impact theory, collective reproduction
of cultural stereotypes, and TPM has offered a general view of communi-
cation and culture. The dynamic social impact theory explains the spatial
distribution of social representations. Studies of collective reproduction
of stereotype illustrate how cultural representations are maintained
through serial reproductions of a message, and the TPM explicates how
cultural representations change through communication. All three lines
of research grant a special place to communication in the overall develop-
ment of culture. It is through communication that clustering, correlation,
consolidation, and continued diversity can occur. Interpersonal commu-
nication contributes significantly to the reproduction and evolution of
culture. Informative as it is, however, this area of research does not di-
rectly address processes at a micro, individual level.
In the next two sections, we seek to explicate some of the micro pro-
cesses involved in the intricate relationships between communication,
shared representations, and culture. As noted, for a representation to be
culturally influential, it has to be “widely and durably distributed in a
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social group” (Sperber, 1996, p. 49). A widely distributed representation
is a highly shareable representation, whereas a durably distributed rep-
resentation requires internalization of the representation so that it will
be reliably reproduced across time and situations.
CONSTRUCTION OF SHARED REPRESENTATIONS IN
COMMUNICATION
Bruner (1990) submits that, “(b)y virtue of participation in culture,
meaning is rendered public and shared. Our culturally adapted way of
life depends upon shared meanings and shared concepts and depends
as well upon shared modes of discourse for negotiating differences in
meaning and interpretation” (pp. 12-13, emphasis). Accordingly, by fol-
lowing a set of rules governing interpersonal communication, people in-
advertently modify their private, idiosyncratic conception of a state of
affairs and reach a common understanding of that situation. As noted,
these shared representations constitute the contents of a culture.
Research has shown that two rules of communication are necessary for
the construction of shared representations in interpersonal communica-
tion. First, communicators should have in mind the addressee’s knowl-
edge when they produce a message. Second, communicators should
collaborate to establish mutually acceptable representations of a specific
situation. The first rule assumes that people may have some prior knowl-
edge of what their addressee knows and does not know before they en-
gage in communication, and that they should use this knowledge to
produce an initial message for their communication partner. The second
principle assumes that communicators are prepared to make use of the
addressee’s feedback to adjust their initial assumptions of the addressee’s
knowledge and subsequently modify their message for the addressee
(Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Fussell & Krauss, 1992; Isaacs & Clark, 1987;
Krauss & Fussell, 1991; 1996; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992).
COMMON GROUND AND ESTIMATION OF SOCIAL
DISTRIBUTION OF KNOWLEDGE
Consistent with the first rule, research has shown that in producing a
communicative message, speakers make assumptions about the com-
mon knowledge between themselves and the listener, and restrict them-
selves to words or expressions mutually known by both parties (Clark &
Marshall, 1981; Clark & Murphy, 1982; Clark, Schreuder, & Buttrick,
1983). The intricacy of message formulation can be gleaned from such
mundane acts as giving someone directions to a destination. To tell
someone the location of the psychology department on campus, there
are different kinds of message one can formulate. Among other things,
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one can just point in the general direction of the destination, name the
various landmarks on the way, or describe the number and direction of
turns to make and the approximate distance to travel. What is the basis
for our decision of which kind of direction to give? A logical approach is
to estimate which kind of direction is comprehensible to the audience. In
other words, the direction has to contain information known to both the
speaker and the audience. Indeed, a common ground of knowledge has
been found to be essential for successful communication (Clark &
Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986; Fussell & Krauss, 1991; Isaacs & Clark, 1987;
Schober, 1998; Wilkes-Gibbs & Clark, 1992). But what is the basis for es-
tablishing a common ground?
A first step in establishing a common ground is to estimate what the
communicative partner may or may not know. People are highly accurate
in their estimation of relative distribution of knowledge. For example, the
estimated proportions of people who would know some public figures
(e.g., Clint Eastwood, Ted Turner) and the actual proportions of people
who knew them were highly correlated (r = .95; Fussell & Krauss, 1992,
Experiment 1). In addition, participants’ accuracy was not determined by
their own knowledge of the target figures. Both participants who could
correctly name the targets and those who could not gave quite an accurate
estimation of the relative distribution of knowledge of the targets. In our
own study (Lau, Chiu, & Hong, 2000, Experiment 1), participants, who
were Hong Kong residents, were asked to estimate other Hong Kong resi-
dents’ knowledge of specific landmarks in Hong Kong, Macau, and New
York City, and to identify the landmarks themselves. Identification of
landmarks provided a direct estimation of the proportion of people who
knew the landmarks in question. In general, although participants tended
to overestimate for the targets they themselves knew, they were generally
sensitive to the relative distribution of knowledge of the landmarks. Their
estimation of the percentage of people who could identify the landmarks
correlated very highly with the actual percentage of people who could
correctly identify the landmarks (r = .94).
AUDIENCE DESIGN IN MESSAGE PRODUCTION
People utilize the estimated social distribution of knowledge when they
formulate a message for their communication partner (Lau & Chiu,
1999). In one experiment (Lau et al., 2000, Experiment 2), we showed
participants, all Hong Kong residents, pictures of 30 specific landmarks
in Hong Kong, Macau, or New York City. The participants described
each landmark, so that another Hong Kong resident could identify from
the description which of the landmarks was being referred to. It was ex-
pected that participants’ descriptions of the landmarks would show
considerations for the estimated knowledge of the audience. In particu-
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lar, they would provide brief direction when the communicative part-
ners shared knowledge of the landmarks and more detailed directions
when there was no such common ground (see Kingsbury, 1968). Fur-
thermore, a speaker describing the landmarks would be more likely to
refer to the name of the landmark when the listener was familiar with the
city than when her or she was not (see Isaacs & Clark, 1987). As expected,
when the target stimuli were judged to have relatively low
recognizability (in Experiment 1), speakers provided more information
in their description and were less likely to mention the name of the stim-
uli. This result demonstrated a clear influence of knowledge estimation
on message formulation.
Fussell and Krauss (1992) also found that participants’ estimation of
the proportion of people who could recognize a target object influenced
their message formulation. In our study, the speakers did not receive
feedback from the listener. In the Fussell and Krauss study, listener feed-
back was allowed. Fussell and Krauss showed that the estimation of
their partner’s knowledge of the target exerted the most influence on the
speaker’s first referential message to their partner, in which more identi-
fying information was included with the name of the target when its esti-
mated identifiability was low. The correlation between judged
identifiability of the objects and message length was -.66.
Just as there are many different ways to communicate one’s thoughts,
there are many different ways to interpret an utterance. Consider this
sentence: The working class is the pillar of our country. It could be inter-
preted as stating the value of the working class or a euphemism for the
exploitation of the working people. The resulting representation would
be very different for the two interpretations. What guides people’s inter-
pretation of utterances?
Assuming that both addressers and addressees strive to establish a
common ground for communication, the parties work with the mutual
expectation that each party will cooperate so that the addressees can un-
derstand the addressers appropriately (the Gricean cooperative princi-
ple of communication). The addressers’ best bet is to present an
utterance that most people would interpret in a similar way.1 Therefore,
one kind of information that receivers could use to aid interpretation is
to estimate how most people would interpret the same utterance in the
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1. It is possible that under some circumstances, addressers intend for addressees to
make idiosyncratic interpretations of their utterances, especially when the two parties are
communicating something private in the public using privileged information (Ng, 1996).
For example, John may want to meet Betty in a cafe at a certain time but does not want
Larry, who is also present, to know. In that case, John may make an utterance that intends
Betty to make an interpretation that Larry would not. However, such instances are more of
an exception rather than the rule of everyday communication.
same context. Similar to knowledge estimation, it is an estimation of the
social distribution of information; in the case of consensual information,
it is an estimation of interpretation instead of knowledge.
Yeung (2000) investigated the role of consensual information in peo-
ple’s interpretation of the directness of utterances. An utterance is con-
sidered as a direct speech act if its literal meaning is the same as what the
speaker intends to communicate; an utterance is considered as indirect
when the speaker means more, or less, than what is said. In interpreting
whether an utterance is a direct or an indirect speech act, consensual in-
formation may be very useful.
In the study, Yeung provided participants with lists of utterances and
the context (in the form of scenarios) within which to interpret them. Par-
ticipants judged whether each of the utterances was a direct or an indirect
speech act, rated the extent of directness or indirectness, and estimated the
overall proportion of participants who would judge an utterance as direct
or indirect. Participants were accurate in estimating the overall percent-
age of participants who would judge an utterance as direct or indirect.2
More importantly, participants’ knowledge of the distribution of direct-
ness judgment was reflected in their directness judgment decision time
and directness ratings-the higher the actual and estimated consensus in
directness (indirectness) judgment, the shorter the directness (indirect-
ness) decision time and the higher the directness (indirectness) ratings.
The pattern of results suggested that people do consider consensual
knowledge in interpreting utterances. To begin with, people are quite ac-
curate in estimating how most people would interpret an utterance. When
their own judgments agree with what they estimate most people would
judge, they spend less time to come to a decision and are more confident in
their judgment. On the other hand, when their own judgments are differ-
ent from what they estimate most people would judge, they spend a little
more time to think about their decisions.
In short, the evidence reveals that both the speakers and the listeners
have the social distribution of information in mind when they construct
or decode messages.
ESTABLISHMENT OF SHARED REPRESENTATION IN
COMMUNICATION
The foregoing analysis suggests that communicators rely on the estima-
tion of shared knowledge to tailor at least the first message for their part-
ners. In normal conversations, communication partners successively
take each other’s perspective when formulating and comprehending ex-
changed utterances. When direct interaction is possible, such as when
communication partners are interacting face to face, knowledge coordi-
nation is a joint responsibility. A typical referential communicative se-
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quence begins with a referring expression, followed by feedback from
the listener, which can be used by the speaker to repair the expression.
After one or several rounds of such expression presentation and repair,
in most cases, the conversational partners arrive at a mutually accept-
able referring expression for the target and communication is deemed
successful (Clark & Wilkes-Gibbs, 1986).
In a referential communication experiment, Wilkes-Gibbs and Kim
(1991) provided a good illustration of how shared representations are
formed during communication. In this experiment, participants were
presented with a set of ambiguous graphic designs that could be re-
ferred to by one of two alternate expressions (e.g., “Viking ship” vs.
“person swimming”). One person in a dyad was induced to encode the
drawings using one set of expressions, while another person used a dif-
ferent set of expressions. When the dyad communicated the figures in a
referential communication task, they gradually developed a set of mutu-
ally acceptable expressions for these figures.
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL PROCESSES
The findings reviewed above suggest that in communication, partici-
pants strive to establish a shared reality. In doing so, they estimate the
extent of shareability of social knowledge in their community. The evi-
dence suggests that people are remarkably accurate in making such esti-
mations. In addition, when communicators produce a message for their
addressee, they draw on this knowledge. Speakers assume their ad-
dressee is more willing to accept a widely shared representation than a
less widely shared one, and thus tend to use brief messages to communi-
cate it. Listeners also take into account the social distribution of repre-
sentations when they decode the meaning of a message. They are more
ready to accept a widely shared interpretation of the message than a rela-
tively idiosyncratic one. The foregoing analysis suggests that within a
community, widely shared knowledge is likely to be used in message
construction. Similarly, interpretations that are popular in the commu-
nity are also relatively likely to be used to guide message comprehen-
sion.
Thus far, our analysis has been restricted to the interface between com-
munication and the social distribution of specific knowledge about the
topic of conversation. The analysis can be easily extended to other kinds
of social representations (such as beliefs, attitudes, and norms). For ex-
ample, conventional ideas and consensually validated beliefs in a com-
munity are likely to be widely shared; frequent activation of such ideas
and beliefs in communication has turned them into some of the most
readily available cognitive tools for social interactions in the culture.
Conventional ideas and beliefs are supported by public representa-
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tions (e.g., social institutions; see Morris, Menon, & Ames, in press;
Sperber, 1996). One important public representation of culture is lan-
guage. Research dating back to Benjamin Whorf (1956) has suggested
that differences in linguistic forms across languages may reflect deep
differences in shared worldviews in the relevant linguistic communities
(Lau, Lee, & Chiu, in press). Because people in a cultural group are fre-
quently exposed to public representations, the contents of linguistic and
other public representations are frequently activated and chronically ac-
cessible (Hong et al., 2000).
An illustration of the cultural supporting role of language is the case of
pronoun drop and the set of cultural beliefs of “individualism.”
Kashima and Kashima (1998) contend that the linguistic system of pro-
noun encodes conceptions of the person and others. According to them,
the use of pronouns (e.g., “I,” ‘you" in English) sustains attention on the
referent of the pronoun, bringing the person out from the conversational
background. Thus, the tolerance for a pronoun drop is suggestive of the
psychological differentiation between the speaker and the speech con-
text. In some languages (e.g., English), the use of a pronoun is grammati-
cally obligatory. In other languages (e.g., Spanish), the subject pronoun
can be dropped because the referent can be recovered from the verb in-
flections. There are some languages (e.g., Chinese) in which the subject
pronoun can be dropped even though there is neither verb inflection nor
the subject-verb agreement rule. The grammatical obligatory use of the
first-person pronoun maximally distinguishes the speaker’s self. Simi-
larly, the obligatory use of the second-person pronoun maximally dis-
tinguishes the addressee(s). The omission of either one or both of the two
classes of pronouns de-emphasizes the salience of their corresponding
referent(s). In a study of 76 countries, there was a strong negative corre-
lation (r = -.64) between a country’s emphasis on individualism and the
grammatical tolerance for pronoun drop in the dominant language in
the country (Kashima & Kashima, 1998).
Given that one major use of language is communication, communica-
tors in cultures emphasizing individualism are, likely to be obligated by
the language they use to consistently distinguish the person from the
context. Thus, the shared beliefs of individualism encoded in the lan-
guage are activated whenever members of these cultures use language
to communicate their thoughts.
The interpersonal nature of communication reinforces the shareability
of social representations. Interpersonal communication is a social pro-
cess whereby communicators get to know and influence the mind of
their communication partner. This social process is directly relevant to
the diffusion of social representations. Furthermore, the communicative
process contributes to the chronic accessibility of shared knowledge
even when it is not encoded in linguistic structures. Every time people in
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a culture produce a message for another member of the same culture,
they spontaneously activate the knowledge that presumably is shared in
the culture. This cognitive process should help to increase the ease with
which shared representations can be accessed.
Our analysis echoes and expands a similar analysis of the cultural pro-
cesses initiated by Sperber (1996), who sought to explain culture by de-
scribing the means by which cognitive presentations are spread from
one individual to another.
The diffusion of a folktale and that of a military skill, for instance, involves
different cognitive abilities, different motivations, and different environ-
mental factors . . . potentially pertinent psychological factors include the
ease with which a particular representation can be memorized, the exis-
tence of background knowledge . . . and a motivation to communicate the
content of the representation. (p. 83-84)
Sperber also contended that interpersonal communication may trans-
form private idiosyncratic representations of a state of affairs into shared
representations. As shown in the Wilkes-Gibbs and Kim (1991) experi-
ment, speakers sometimes over-estimate the shareability of their idio-
syncratic representation of a particular state of affairs and hence
produce a message that is not interpretable within the shared back-
ground knowledge. Under these circumstances, the communicators
would spontaneously engage in a dialogic process to reach consensus on
a mutually acceptable representation of the state of affairs (Krauss &
Fussell, 1996). In short, “through communication, the private cognitions
of individuals can be made and directed toward a shared representation
of the referent” (Krauss & Chiu, 1998, p. 53).
COGNITIVE CONSEQUENCES OF COMMUNICATION
As noted, when people negotiate meanings of a specific situation in in-
terpersonal communication, shared representations of that state of af-
fairs emerge. Moreover, the conversationalist would become
cognitively committed to a shared interpretation of reality (Rommetveit,
1984). In this section, we review evidence that shows how the shared
representations of a situation created in communication could over-
shadow other forms of representation of the same state of affairs and be-
come the communicator’s “habitual” way of representing the reality.
EFFECT OF LANGUAGE USE
Krauss, Chiu, and their associates (Chiu, Krauss, & Lau, 1998; Chiu et al.,
1999; Krauss & Chiu, 1998) proposed that using language may evoke in-
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ternal representations, and that such internal representations can influ-
ence subsequent cognitions.
When the same state of affairs has been encoded in both verbal and vi-
sual representational formats, and if the state of affairs is not readily de-
scribable, then the representations in different formats would most
likely contain different information. Under such circumstances, compe-
tition may occur between the two forms of representations. In a series of
experiments conducted by Schooler and his associates (Schooler &
Engstler-Schooler, 1990; Fallshore & Schooler, 1995), participants who
verbalized a description of a face they had seen were less able later to rec-
ognize that face compared with participants who had seen the face and
visualized it, or who had simply seen the face and then performed a
distractor task. It has been suggested that featural information of faces is
easier to verbalize than configural information (Fallshore & Schooler,
1995). Thus it is possible that describing a face evokes a relatively fea-
ture-based representation, whereas perceptually processing the same
face creates a representation that is relatively configurally-based. Ac-
cording to Schooler’s recoding interference hypothesis, under such cir-
cumstances, the verbal representation may compete with or
“overshadow” the visual representation when the state of affairs is later
recalled.
As suggested by the verbal overshadowing hypothesis, how a state of
affairs is described can affect how it will be represented in memory. In a
recent study (Lee & Chiu, 2001), participants were presented a set of out-
line drawings one at a time. Figure 1(a) shows one of the drawings used
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FIGURE 1.  An Example of the Drawings Used in the Lee and Chiu Experiments.
Note. (a) One of the stimulus drawings. (b) A constituent part used in the recognition task.
in the experiment. In the Figural Description Condition, participants de-
scribed what each of the outline drawings looked like (e.g., “It looks like
a fish”). Participants in the Literal Description Condition saw the same
drawings but described the constituent parts of the drawings (e.g., “It
has in it a triangle and a parallelogram”). Participants in different experi-
mental conditions were given the same amount of time to process the
stimuli. After all participants had carried out a 10-minute distractor task,
they were given a recognition task. On each trial, a geometric figure (Fig-
ure 1(b)) was shown and the participants decided whether the geometric
figure was a constituent part of one of the outline drawings they had pre-
viously seen. Participants in the Figural Description Condition made
significantly more errors than did those in the Literal Description Condi-
tion. One interpretation of this finding is that the use of figural labels to
describe a drawing evoked linguistic representation, which contained
relatively little featural information of the drawings.3 Such representa-
tions overshadowed the perceptual representation of the drawings and
hence interfered with the recognition of the featural properties of the
original stimuli.
In another experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of
three experimental conditions. Participants performed an encoding and
a judgment task. In the encoding task, participants in the Figural De-
scription Condition used figural labels to describe the drawings,
whereas those in the Literal Description Condition described the constit-
uent parts of the drawings. Finally, in the Control Condition, partici-
pants viewed the drawings but did not describe them. On each trial in
the judgment task, participants were shown a drawing and either a
figural or literal description. They were asked to judge as quickly as pos-
sible whether the description matched the drawing. When the descrip-
tion matched the drawing, compared to the participants in the Control
condition, participants in the Figural Condition needed more (less) time
to make an affirmative response when the description was a literal
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3. Previous research has also found that encoding a visual stimulus in terms of figural la-
bels creates cognitive biases, whereas describing the stimulus in terms of its constituent
parts does not (Higgins, 1981). This finding suggests that there are boundary conditions
for the cognitive effects of language use described above. Some representations are less af-
fected by our choice of linguistic expression.
It is still unclear at which information processing stage featural information in the
figural representations is lost. It is possible that participants in the Figural Description
Condition did not pay much attention to the featural properties when they encoded the
stimuli. It is also possible that featural information was discarded after the figural repre-
sentations had been constructed. Finally, as Higgins (1981) posits, literal representations
contain mostly prepositional knowledge, which can easily accommodate specific featural
information. However, figural representations often assume the form of prototypes, and
specific featural information may be distorted to fit the prototypes.
(figural) description. The effects of literal description on reaction times
were not significant. Again, the use of figural labels to describe an object
could evoke mental representations that could interfere with the recog-
nition of the featural properties in the visual representation.
The recoding interference hypothesis also applies to different repre-
sentations of the same encoding format. Use of synonyms and semanti-
cally related words render multiple verbal representations of the same
state of affairs possible. There are some expressions that can be used in-
terchangeably without significant representational implications. For
example, by describing a city center as full of “ramshackle” versus “di-
lapidated” buildings, the resulting representations of the city center
would differ very little. However, referring to the same person as a
“woman” versus “lady” would probably lead to different internal rep-
resentations (see Lakoff, 1973; Tong, Chiu, & Fu, 2001). In the
Wilkes-Gibbs and Kim (1991) experiment described above, partici-
pants were tested for their memory of the referents after a delay. The re-
sults showed that regardless of how they labeled the referents initially,
their subsequent memories were biased in the direction of the label
they used to communicate about the referents in the communication
task.
As noted, our analysis can be easily extended from representations of
factual knowledge to other kinds of social representations, such as atti-
tudes and opinions. In the course of communication, people may shift
their message and speech styles to become more similar to or different
from those of their conversation partner, depending on whether they
want to associate or dissociate with the conversation partner (see Krauss
& Chiu, 1998). In a series of experiments, Higgins and his colleagues
(Higgins, McCann, & Fondacaro, 1982; see also Higgins & McCann,
1984; Higgins & Rholes, 1978; McCann, Higgins, & Fondacaro, 1991)
found that variations in the linguistic representation of a state of affairs
that derive from the speaker’s communicative goals may also affect the
way the speaker remembers and thinks about that state of affairs. In
these experiments, participants read about the behavior of a person
(“Donald”) which included some behavior that could be characterized
either positively or negatively (e.g., independent vs. aloof; persistent vs.
stubborn). Next, they were told to convey their impression of Donald to
a partner, who had met Donald and had formed either a favorable or un-
favorable impression of him. As expected, participants characterized
Donald’s ambiguous traits more positively in messages intended for
someone whose impression of him was favorable, and more negatively
in messages intended for someone whose impression of him was unfa-
vorable. More importantly, participants’ subsequent recall of the behav-
ioral description of Donald tended to be biased in the direction of their
previous messages.
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To conclude, the linguistic representation evoked in a specific commu-
nication context may bias subsequent representation in the direction of
the linguistic representation.
IMPLICATIONS FOR UNDERSTANDING CULTURAL PROCESSES
As noted, for a social representation to be culturally influential, it has to
be durably distributed in a social group (Sperber, 1996). A primary func-
tion of communication is to construct a shared meaning on the topic
among the communication partners (Higgins, 1992; Hardin & Higgins,
1996; Moscovici, 1988; Schegloff, 1991). The evidence reviewed in this
section shows that the shared meanings established in communication
can outlast the immediate interaction context and be deployed in subse-
quent social interactions. If, as the evidence shows, people who have
participated in communication are more cognitively committed to the
shared representations which emerged during communication, com-
munication could help to consolidate conventional or consensually vali-
dated ideas and beliefs in a culture. The TPM also assumes that
representations created in new episodic interactions with group mem-
bers could overshadow existing representations. We submit that over-
shadowing occurs because a linguistic representation of the shared
reality is evoked in communication. Like us, Higgins (1992) also believes
that the achievement of a shared reality with the audience about the is-
sue of conversation is necessary for verbal overshadowing effects of cog-
nition to occur; “messages that do not achieve, or even prevent, a shared
reality about a target person would not subsequently impact on commu-
nicators’ memory and impressions of the target person, or at least would
impact to a lesser degree” (p. 118).
CONCLUSION
We have tried to explicate the detailed social cognitive processes that are
implicated in the establishment, maintenance, and transformation of
shared representations. Many theorists believe that communication is
central to the understanding of these processes, which in turn account
for the formation of culture (e.g., Bruner, 1990; Sperber, 1996). Although
some recent models (e.g., dynamic social impact theory, the TPM) have
furnished these broad ideas with more specific descriptions of how
shared representations emerge in social interactions, they do not ad-
dress the specific social cognitive processes involved. To reiterate
Sperber’s (1996) assertion, to explain culture we need to specify how
shared ideas and beliefs “are cognized by individuals and communi-
cated within a group.” In this paper, we draw on the relevant literatures
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to provide a working model of these processes, which is summarized in
Figure 2.
This model depicts how culture and its constituent shared represen-
tations evolve through social communication. To begin with, commu-
nication takes place within the context of a cultural background, which
includes the historical, immediate, and projected physical and linguis-
tic environment assumed to be commonly known to members of a cul-
ture. As communicative acts are goal-directed behaviors, culturally
salient communicative intentions (e.g., self-enhancement, group har-
mony) may guide the pattern of language use within a cultural group.
The shared communication context constrains the production and
comprehension of communicative messages, and serves as the back-
drop for the construction and evolution of social representations in
communication.
Within this communication context, individuals engaging in social
communication strive to establish a shared reality. To achieve that end,
the communicators evoke a common ground of knowledge to guide
message production and comprehension. Part of this knowledge is
shared by the dyad only, and part of it is shared more widely in the lin-
guistic community. In using the latter kind of knowledge, communica-
tors estimate the extent of shareability of social knowledge in their
community. This process ensures that widely shared knowledge is fre-
quently used in message construction across individuals. Frequent acti-
vation of shared knowledge in turn increases the ease with which this
knowledge can be accessed in subsequent interactions. Similarly, inter-
pretations that are popular in the community are often used to guide
message comprehension. Hence, there is a greater chance for widely
shared representations than for other representations to be maintained
in a culture.
In the communicative process, when a communicator produces an id-
iosyncratic message, the interaction partner will provide feedback (or
back channel responses) to guide message repair (Krauss &
Weinheimer, 1966). In short, the dyad will work together to arrive at mu-
tually acceptable representations in the communicative process. This
analysis implies that widely accepted representations are minimally
transformed and idiosyncratic representations are likely to be modified
in communication. According to Sperber (1996), representations that are
“repeatedly communicated and minimally transformed in the process
will end up belonging to the culture” (p. 83, emphasis).
During the communication process, ideas and beliefs are transmitted.
If the shared reality that emerges from communication is consistent with
the communicators’ original representations, which are likely to be
framed in terms of culturally shared representations, the original repre-
sentations are reinforced both in the minds of the individual communi-
366 LAU, CHIU, AND LEE
cators and in the culture. When there are discrepancies between the
initial representations and the newly established shared representa-
tions, the new representations may overshadow the original ones, lead-
ing to internalization of new representations. The new representations,
if activated frequently enough in other communications in the culture,
may be incorporated into the culture. With increasingly frequent cul-
tural contacts (e.g., tourism, migration), individuals will meet people
from many different cultures. In transcultural communication, commu-
nicators may not have enough common background knowledge. Hence,
there is an immediate need to negotiate meanings and establish mutu-
ally acceptable representations in communication. Again, the newly es-
tablished shared representations may later be incorporated into the
culture and lead to cultural changes.
COMMUNICATION AND CULTURE 367
FIGURE 2.  Communication and Shared Representations—A Working Model.
At the beginning of this paper, we alluded to the fascinating research
on cross-cultural variations in human cognitions and motivation. This
research has revealed deep cultural differences in some basic psycholog-
ical processes. A major problem with this research is that it tends to focus
on describing static cross-cultural differences without explaining how
these differences emerge. We contend that culture should be viewed as a
dynamic meaning system, and its members help to construct it when
they communicate and negotiate the meanings of their experiences.
Hopefully, this approach to understanding the social psychological
foundation of culture could help to answer the question of why some
shared ideas become entrenched in a culture while others are eroded af-
ter repeated social interactions.
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2. Participants’ directness judgment estimation, however, was biased somewhat in the
direction of their own belief, indicating the presence of false consensus bias, as in the case
of knowledge judgment.
